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ABSTRACT
Web applications require exchanging parameters between a client
and a server to function properly. In real-world systems such as
online banking transfer, traversing multiple pages with parameters
contributed by both the user and server is a must, and hence the
applications have to enforce workflow and parameter dependency
controls across multiple requests. An application that applies in-
sufficient server-side input validations is however vulnerable to pa-
rameter tampering attacks, which manipulate the exchanged pa-
rameters. Existing fuzzing-based scanning approaches however
neglected these important controls, and this caused their fuzzing
requests to be dropped before they can reach any vulnerable code.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to identify the work-
flow and parameter dependent constraints, which are then main-
tained and leveraged for automatic detection of server acceptances
during fuzzing. We realized the approach by building a generic
blackbox parameter tampering scanner. It successfully uncovered
a number of severe vulnerabilities, including one from the largest
multi-national banking website, which other scanners miss.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.5 [Online Information Services]: Web-based services; K.4.4
[Electronic Commerce]: Security
Keywords
parameter tampering; parameter dependency; in-context fuzzing;
state-aware fuzzing
1. INTRODUCTION
Web applications typically require traversing multiple pages with
parameters exchanged between a client and a server to complete
even a single action. Figure 1 depicts a simplified workflow of
an online banking transfer application used by the HSBC bank, in
which a user can transfer a certain amount of money (i.e., AMT)
from his account FROM only to an authorized account TO. While
user-supplied transaction details (i.e.,FROM, TO, AMT) are taken
from input elements of a form, those server-generated ones such as
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Figure 1: A vulnerable banking transfer application enforces work-
flow and parameter dependency controls across multiple requests
session ID (SESSID) and the one-time use tokens working against
Cross-Site Request Forgeries (CSRF1&2) are respectively set in
Cookies and hidden fields. In StepA, client-side validations are
applied to restrict and instantly prompt the user for input correc-
tions before the form can be submitted. Upon a valid submission,
the ServHandlerA verifies the CSRF1 token, validates the user in-
puts, and responds with a review page for StepB . The user confirms
the transaction by submitting ReqB , and finally the ServHandlerB
executes the actual banking transfer and returns an acknowledg-
ment page for user’s reference at StepC . It is worth noting that
ServHandlerB enforces, among others, that the received token CSRF2
and TO account respectively match with their previously stored val-
ues (i.e., sess.CSRF2 and sess.TO).
Such kind of web applications are however vulnerable to param-
eter tampering that is known to attack insecure direct object ref-
erences, which is ranked No. 4 in the OWASP Top 10 Web Ap-
plication Security Risks [26]. The vulnerability often arises from
a misconception that the object references directly exposed as pa-
rameters to the client-side (and their validations) are assumed im-
mutable, and thus improper or insufficient validations were applied
at the server [10]. As shown in the motivating example, the server
does not validate whether the TO account is authorized (i.e., TO
is missing at valid(FROM,AMT) in ServHandlerA). Hence, an
attacker who has compromised a victim’s session can tamper the
TO parameter and bypass any associated client-side validations in
order to commit unauthorized banking transfers.
The parameter tampering vulnerability revealed above is how-
ever hardly discoverable despite many research efforts that were
dedicated to web vulnerability scanning [5,7–9,11,13,29,32]. There
are two fundamental reasons. First, blackbox fuzzing-based scan-
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ners such as [1,7,20,25] cannot preserve the intended workflow. It
is because they literally work in a “crawl-once-fuzz-many” manner,
that captures a set of requests only once during crawling, and these
requests will become the only bases to generate subsequent fuzzing
requests. However, the one-time use tokens such as CSRF1&2 ex-
pire as soon as they are accepted by the server during crawling.
Regardless of how parameters are mutated, subsequent fuzzing at-
tempts that reuse such expired tokens will all be rejected.
Second, existing blackbox scanners neglect cross-request param-
eter dependencies. To uncover the vulnerbility in the banking ex-
ample, the TO account from ReqA and the one later sent in ReqB
must be equal. It is because ServHandlerA stores the user-supplied
parameter TO from ReqA into sess.TO. When receiving ReqB ,
ServHandlerB enforces that TO in ReqB must match with the stored
sess.TO. If they are different, ReqB will be rejected before any
parameters can reach the vulnerable code. None of the blackbox
fuzzing tools can identify this constraint and maintain the required
parameter dependencies across the requests. While a state-aware
fuzzer is recently proposed to observe the workflow control [11],
its fuzzing requests are still insensitive towards cross-request de-
pendencies. For other approaches that consider parameter relation-
ships [33, 34], they are largely manual and protocol-specific.
This paper presents Cross-Request Scanner (CRS), a novel ap-
proach that respects and leverages the intended workflow and pa-
rameter dependency controls while scanning for parameter tamper-
ing vulnerabilities. CRS consists of two phases: capturing and
fuzzing. In the capturing phase, CRS records a set of valid user
actions, identifies the one-time tokens, tracks the cross-request pa-
rameter dependencies, and learns key features (e.g., locations of
submit buttons and reflected parameters) that indicate a server ac-
ceptance from rendered server responses.
In the fuzzing phase, CRS sequentially replays the user actions to
fetch new responses while keeping those confirmed one-time and
dependent parameters intact so as to preserve the intended work-
flow and parameter dependency. Other parameters are mutated and
placed back to the application itself for validations. Only those
client-side rejected parameters are then forcefully submitted by by-
passing client-side validations. Finally, it reports a vulnerability if
the server accepts the mutated parameters and gives responses that
are in line with those key features learned in the initial valid sub-
missions (e.g., submit buttons reappeared, parameters reflected).
While CRS takes a set of manually provided user actions, we ar-
gue that it is unavoidable in discovering parameter tampering vul-
nerabilities (i.e., unlike discovering XSS by simply asserting a pop-
up dialog after an injection of what comprises alert(1)). Refer-
ring to the banking example, a parameter tampering vulnerability
can be resulted by mutating only a digit in the TO account. There-
fore, it is clear that the semantic meaning and underlying conse-
quence of a mutation can be domain-specific, and thus known only
to humans. Existing work also corroborate the needs of manual ef-
fort [12, 34]. CRS requires the least amount of manual assistance
among blackbox parameter tampering scanners [1, 7, 20, 25].
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A field study on online banking applications to understand
their workflow and implementations, and how they can be
intercepted for vulnerability scanning.
• A novel approach that respects the intended workflow and
cross-request parameter dependency while fuzzing, as well
as to correlate the dependency in both requests and responses
for automatic detection of server acceptances.
• An “in-context fuzzing” technique to build a blackbox vul-
nerability scanner that drives fuzzing in the application con-
text allowing dynamic features to be preserved, and thus im-
proving coverage and accuracy.
• The discovery of real-world vulnerabilities that are uncov-
ered only by our scanner, which existing approaches miss.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the online banking transfer applications of different banks.
Section 3 discusses the CRS approach. Section 4 provides some
technical background on the web applications, followed by the im-
plementation of the CRS scanner. Section 5 evaluates the scanner,
and details the vulnerabilities uncovered. Section 6 presents related
work. Finally, we conclude.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
This paper focuses on real-world applications, and that makes
the testing intrinsically blackbox and more challenging owing to
the lack of server-side source code. This section summarizes four
representative banking transfer applications, which are among the
most security-critical operations being carried out over the Internet.
They include Citibank, HSBC, Bank of China (BOC), and Bank of
East Asia (BEA), with their headquarters respectively located at the
US, UK, China, and Hong Kong. The unauthorized transfers that
are made possible in HSBC and BEA are discussed in Section 5.3.
2.1 Workflow Design
As outlined in Figure 1, all banks adopt a three-step workflow
design to receive instructions of banking transfers.
StepA. A user specifies a source (i.e., FROM) and a destination
(i.e., TO) account besides setting an amount (i.e., AMT) to transfer.
The government mandates that the user can transfer his money only
to third-party accounts that are authorized through an out-of-band
channel. HSBC accepts unauthorized accounts to be specified in
this step, and provides on-the-fly authorization in the next step, as
shown in Figure 3. Citibank and BOC users can pre-authorize an
account beforehand in a separate online form with an One-Time
Password (OTP) that is received through SMS. BEA offers only
offline authorization (i.e., must register an account by person in a
physical branch). Finally, the user submits ReqA by clicking “Go”.
StepB . The user reviews the transaction details returned by the
server. If an HSBC user has specified an unauthorized account in
StepA, he needs to enter an OTP token from his own hardware de-
vice for on-the-fly authorization, as detailed in Section 5.3.1. The
user finally submits again by clicking “confirm” to send ReqB .
StepC . The transfer instruction is acknowledged with a transac-
tion number. The transaction details are shown for user’s reference.
2.2 Workflow Implementation
Notably, HSBC, BOC and BEA implement each step of the work-
flow in a separate page, while Citibank integrates all steps in a sin-
gle AJAX page with the use of XMLHttpRequest API. Their
workflow implementations are outlined as follows:
StepA. Client-side code is implemented to restrict the user-
supplied input parameters (i.e., FROM, TO, AMT) before they can
be submitted (as ReqA) together with a CSRF1 token that is server-
generated and placed in a hidden field. All banks apply some client-
side pre-processing (e.g., manipulating values of hidden fields) be-
fore validating and submitting the form. The submission approaches
vary from one bank to another, as detailed in Section 4.1.2.
ServHandlerA. The server verifies whether the CSRF1 token
matches with what was previously stored. Upon validating other
parameters that represent the transaction details, the server stores
them temporarily. Finally, it returns a review page in which a newly
generated CSRF2 token is embedded in a hidden field. Notice that
Table 1: The website features that are essential for effective fuzzing by blackbox web vulnerability scanners
Websites Studied Param. Tampering Scanners Web Vulnerability Scanners
HSBC BEA BOC HSB Citibank Webjet Jetstar CRS NoTamper[7]
Proxy-based
[1, 20, 25]
Traditional
[2, 31]
State-aware
[11]
Multi-request Applications
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
AJAX Applications
√ √ √ √ √
Workflow Enforcement
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
One-time Use Tokens
√ √ √ √ √ √
Parameter Dependency
√ √ √ √ √
Client-side Pre-processing
√ √ √ √ √ √
besides defending against CSRF, both CSRF1&2 tokens can also
serve the purposes of enforcing the intended workflow and prevent-
ing duplicate transactions owing to their nature of one-time uses.
StepB . It echoes all transaction-related parameters visually for
user’s review, and that a confirming click will naturally include the
hidden CSRF2 token in the submission ReqB . In HSBC, an OTP
parameter may be solicited for account authorization. For HSBC
and BOC, this step also serves to resubmit those transaction pa-
rameters gathered from StepA by embedding them in hidden fields.
ServHandlerB . The server again verifies the CSRF2 token be-
forehand. In HSBC, the OTP parameter, if provided, will then be
verified. HSBC and BOC further ensure if some transaction-related
parameters match with those stored at ServHandlerA. The server fi-
nally executes the transfer with the transaction parameters.
StepC . The transaction details and a reference number are shown.
2.3 Intrinsic Limitations of Existing Scanners
We verify that the banks enforce the workflow design and param-
eter dependency across requests by empirically and systematically
running a series of experiments in their banking transfer applica-
tions. We first interact with an application through its user interface
(UI), and capture a pair of submission requests from a valid trans-
action, which is referred to as {ReqA.o, ReqB.o}. Next, we prepare
a mutated pair of requests {ReqA.m, ReqB.m}, in which all AMT
parameters are incremented by “1”.
Neglecting Intended Workflow and One-time Tokens. With
this mutated set of requests, we however found that they were all
rejected by the server through the following experiments. First of
all, the requests were replayed according to a sequence of a few
ReqA.ms and then some ReqB.ms, of which the sequence obvi-
ously violates the intended workflow. The requests were all re-
jected. We then proceed to sequentially replay {ReqA.m, ReqB.m,
ReqA.m, ReqB.m}, but they were still rejected despite observing
the workflow.
The server actually responds differently to requests that are ini-
tiated by re-interacting with the application as usual. Therefore,
when we interact with the UI and specify the same user-supplied
values (including the incremented AMT) as in those mutated re-
quests, the new requests are accepted as expected. We investigated
all the requests generated through multiple times of UI interac-
tions. We then found some distinct server-generated tokens were
introduced to every request. Since replaying ReqA.o that was once
accepted by the server would result in a failure, we conclude that
these tokens are of one-time uses.
Breaking Cross-request Parameter Dependency. As discussed
in Section 5.3.1, it is found that HSBC and BOC submit some
transaction-related and other parameters twice in both ReqA and
ReqB . To understand the relationship between the parameters, we
thus run the remaining three possible pairs of request combinations
{ReqA.o, ReqB.m}, {ReqA.m, ReqB.o}, and {ReqA.m, ReqB.m},
in which the one-time tokens are observed. Here, all transaction-
related parameters are “slightly” mutated one by one.
• When running {ReqA.o, ReqB.m}, it is found that some pa-
rameters mutated only at ReqB.m are actually disregarded,
while their corresponding values given at ReqA.o are instead
honored by the server. This result shows that these parame-
ters must be mutated at ReqA during fuzzing. Mutating them
at ReqB.m can be ineffective.
• For {ReqA.m, ReqB.o}, server rejections are resulted since
some parameter values are inconsistent between the request
pair. Clearly, the server enforces certain parameters to be
equal across the requests.
• Likewise, for {ReqA.m, ReqB.m}, server rejections depend
on whether some parameters are mutated in such a way that
the required dependency are broken across both requests.
In a nutshell, existing scanners [1, 2, 7, 11, 20, 25, 31] all suf-
fer from these limitations despite the prevalence of multi-request
applications. The limitations are generic and intrinsic to all web
vulnerability scanners. Hence, most attack vectors in their fuzzing
attempts are incapable of reaching the vulnerable code.
These findings are confirmed by running the publicly available
scanners [1,2,20,25,31], and analyzing their fuzzing patterns against
a banking transfer website mimicked by us. We also carefully
read through the descriptions of those tools that are unavailable to
us [7,11]. We attribute the main reason for such limitations to their
fundamental scanner design. All blackbox scanners are common
in crawling a website only once, and will rely on this static set of
captured requests for mutation and fuzzing. Therefore, it is unsur-
prising that they do not even work well with applications that have
applied token-based CSRF defenses. However, it is non-trivial as
to how such a scanner design can be patched to identify, renew, and
relate a token from a former response to a corresponding fuzzing
request as well as handling the synchronization issues.
3. THE CRS APPROACH
We aim at addressing not only the problems concerned but also
other dynamic characteristics that have made scanning of real-world
web applications difficult. It is hard to resolve all these issues in
the existing scanner design largely owing to their crawl-once-and-
replay-many and stateless fuzzing approaches.
Hence, this paper proposes a parameter tampering scanner called
Cross-Request Scanner (CRS), which structurally changes the tra-
ditional fuzzing approach. Table 1 provides a quick comparison of
various scanners, which shows their support to those website fea-
tures that are essential for effective fuzzing. Here we outline our
approach and its design considerations, which has enabled the dis-
covery of some previously unknown vulnerabilities.
3.1 Overview of CRS
Figure 2 depicts the high-level architecture of CRS, which is a
blackbox parameter tampering scanner designed to find parameters
that are client-side rejected yet server-side accepted [10]. It com-
prises the capturing and fuzzing phases:
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Figure 2: The architecture of Cross-Request Scanner (CRS)
Capturing Phase. While running CRS as a browser add-on, an
analyst provides an initial valid set of submissions by interacting
with a testing application as usual in the browser. CRS captures the
user actions for later replays. Meanwhile, it tracks the parameter
dependency across the submission requests, and thus a parameter
with its value being the same as in the last request is marked de-
pendent. From the server responses, it identifies some candidates
of key features such as locations of submit buttons and reflected
parameters, that can represent an acceptance by the server. It then
replays the original user actions to get a second valid set of sub-
missions, and classifies those parameter values that differ from the
initial submissions as token candidates. In these two valid submis-
sions, those key feature candidates that cannot be reproduced will
be dropped. Finally, it confirms that each token candidate is of one-
time use if a rejection is resulted upon repeating the same request.
Fuzzing Phase. To observe the intended workflow and one-time
use tokens, CRS sequentially replays the user actions and keeps the
tokens intact during fuzzing. Each parameter is mutated and placed
back to the application to undergo its client-side validations. The
dependent parameters are exempted from fuzzing after the candi-
dates are mutated, submitted, and actually confirmed to result in
server rejections. Next, those parameters that are rejected by the
client-side are forcefully submitted with the validations bypassed.
With such a rejected parameter, CRS reports a vulnerability if the
server reacts in such a way that the expected workflow and key
features can be reproduced as in the valid submissions.
3.2 Design Considerations
Here we explain the underlying considerations of the approach.
Preserving Intended Workflow. Sequentially fuzzing a whole
set of requests, one after another, is a necessity to preserve the in-
tended workflow. CRS achieves this by replaying user actions.
Respecting One-time Use Tokens. One-time use tokens are by
definition those server-generated parameters that differ across two
requests even though an identical set of user actions are provided.
Before any user inputs are entered, these tokens are readily present
either in hidden fields or the query string of submission URLs. This
important clue can help eliminate many false classifications. How-
ever, proxy-based scanners [1, 20, 25] which capture a request at
proxy level (i.e., outside the browser context) obviously possess
no such knowledge. To extract these tokens, complex state main-
tenance and even synchronization issues are anticipated if we are
to modify existing scanners to fetch a previous response for token
extraction before making every fuzzing request. In contrast, CRS
proposes to identify and fuzz directly in the browser so that these
tokens are inherently recognizable and well-preserved. After con-
firming that they are of one-time uses, CRS excludes them from
being mutated during fuzzing.
Respecting Parameter Dependency. Given the two valid sets
of requests, CRS marks a parameter as dependent candidate if its
value is equal to any parameters in the last request. This simple
classification might be an overkill, so CRS still fuzzes each depen-
dent candidate once for confirmation. Hence, only those that result
in server rejections will be confirmed as dependent. To preserve the
confirmed dependency, the fuzzer mutates such a parameter only in
the first request it appeared but not in any successive ones. For
instance, if a parameter value in ReqB is confirmed to be depen-
dent to one in ReqA, then it is mutated only at ReqA but kept intact
at ReqB . In fact, this algorithm is also good for locating session-
based tokens of which the values are present in multiple requests
and will expire only after the session is terminated.
Preserving Client-side Preprocessing. Web applications im-
plement their client-side logic using JavaScript. Without any page
loading, modern applications may dynamically add or drop input
fields in response to a user action. In the banking examples studied,
HSBC, BOC, HSB and BEA even manipulate some hidden fields
before performing form validations and submissions. AJAX-driven
websites such as Citibank use the asynchronous XMLHttpRequest
API. Existing scanners are however ignorant to all of them. It may
look intuitive to preserve these features simply by running the ap-
plications in a full-blown browser during testing. But this actually
poses a challenge in preserving these client-side executions while
mutating parameters, to be detailed in Section 4.3.2.
Detecting Client-side Rejection. Some existing approaches in-
fer the validation rules by coding analysis [7, 8]. Given a blackbox
environment, it is however difficult to preserve complex and dy-
namic validations that may even depend on AJAX feedbacks. In-
stead, to be generic, CRS places a mutated parameter back into the
application itself to determine whether a submission is forbidden,
and if so, the parameter must be rejected by client-side validations
and will be used for fuzzing. Concerning the mutation algorithm,
it heuristically derives new values (e.g., +1, × − 1) from either
a user-given or default value besides adopting some static values
from [20]. Although it may not be as exhaustive as what can be
generated through code analysis, it suffices in the current study.
Detecting Server-side Acceptance. Most existing blackbox scan-
ners use edit distances for response classifications [1, 7, 25]. How-
ever, this approach often fails in classifying JSON-formatted [19]
feedbacks that are commonly used in AJAX applications. For re-
sponses such as {success:1} and {success:0}, the zero edit
distance between them makes server acceptances hardly discernible
from rejections. In particular, NoTamper [7] also requires an ana-
lyst to provide a baseline pair of valid and invalid submissions, such
that a fuzzed response can be clustered to the one with closer edit
distance. In contrast, CRS requires only one valid set of submis-
sions, and is able to figure out the invalid responses which must fail
to reproduce the expected submit buttons, workflow, and reflected
parameters. The concept of button detection is similar to a pro-
posal that clusters server responses into different states according
to their outgoing hyperlinks [11]. But here, CRS can support those
responses that may contain no hyperlinks and those with indistin-
guishable edit distances. It is because the classification is applied to
those DOM elements that receive visual changes [23] upon AJAX
feedbacks, rather than tapping directly to the response data.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
To realize our approach as a usable tool, this section first presents
a background study on how parameters are gathered, validated, and
submitted in web applications in general. Next, we detail the im-
plementation of the core components, including the Capturer and
Fuzzer, of the scanner.
4.1 Technical Background of Web Applications
4.1.1 Sources of Parameters and Validations
An HTML form typically encloses a variety of input controls to
take users’ input, and each of which is associated with a name and
optionally a default value (e.g., with the value attribute). Such a
name/value pair then contributes a request parameter during form
submission. On the other hand, server-generated values are typi-
cally embedded in hidden fields, or hardcoded at the query string
of submission URLs.
The choice of an input control can obviously impose a restriction
on the input format that a user is supposed to follow. For instances,
two radio boxes denoting genders with values defaulted to M and
F can prevent users from entering unexpected values, whereas the
use of a hidden field is a means of validation that it must be equal
to the given (or default) value.
In addition, applications can be programmed to apply explicit
client-side validations with JavaScript and HTML 5 API [18]. For
instances, application typically enforces string-valued input to be
composed of only alphanumeric characters, and that numeric input
to be within a proper range (e.g., age >= 18). If a form fails the
validations, the submission must be forbidden.
These explicit validations and those imposed by input controls
are all referred to as client-side validations. Notice that they are
implemented only for improved usability. Input validations must
also be implemented at the server for security purposes.
4.1.2 Form Submissions
Client-side validations must be applied before an actual submis-
sion by registering an event handler to either the submit event of
the form or the click event of a clickable element. In this paper,
the former approach is referred to as the event-based form submis-
sion, and the latter one as programmatic form submission, whereas
those submitted using the XmlHttpRequest API are referred to
as the AJAX form submission. Their behaviors, as detailed below,
essentially govern how they can be intercepted for fuzzing:
Event-based Form Submission. When a user clicks a submit
button (e.g., <input type=image|submit>), or hits “Enter”
in a text field, the submit handler of the form is invoked. If
its return value is set to true, the form proceeds to submit and
will trigger a page load; otherwise, the submission can be forbid-
den. JavaScript validations are applied inside this handler, and
thus the form is submitted only if it is properly validated (i.e.,
return validated(form)).
Programmatic Form Submission. When employing an (click)
event that is non-specific to form submission, the event handler
must explicitly invoke the submit() method for a form submis-
sion. Clearly, this approach will trigger a page load but not the
submit event. The invocation is typically restricted by the form
validity (i.e., validated(form) && form.submit()).
AJAX Form Submission. Modern applications submit a form
at the background without reloading the page. To achieve this with
the submit event handler, false is always returned to cancel
the default submission and thus the page load. There is no page
load problem when using other event handlers such as onclick.
When the form passes the validations, the event handler will invoke
a custom function (e.g., sendAJAX()), that is made to encode the
name/value input pairs as request parameters, and finally submit a
request using the well-known XMLHttpRequest API.
4.2 The Capturer of CRS
When the add-on is being launched alongside the browser, the
Capturer actually begins by recognizing the form submission ap-
proach that is being used. Even before any user actions, it has al-
ready interposed on the submit()method of every form, and reg-
istered an handler to the beforeunload event. If the submit()
method is called, the form submission approach is a programmatic
one. If the beforeunload handler is first fired (i.e., not initiated
by the submit() method), then it is clearly an event-based form
submission. Otherwise, the form submission is using AJAX.
Here we present the implementation of the smaller modules in-
cluding the Action Recorder, Action Player, Parameter Dependency
Detector, One-time Token Detector, and Valid Features Detector.
4.2.1 Action Recorder
The Action Recorder is responsible for capturing the URLs, HTTP
requests and responses of an initial valid set of submissions. The
request URL and parameters are obtained from the attributes and
input elements of the corresponding form, while the responses are
also readily accessible by similar DOM API calls.
On the other hand, it listens to all keystrokes and clicking events,
and takes the unique id attributes or otherwise XPath positions [22]
as references to those target elements that receive the events. This is
implemented by registering event handlers at the document level,
so that they are recorded before propagating down to the target el-
ements or possibly canceled by the intermediate ones.
4.2.2 Action Player
With the captured user actions, the Action Player of the Cap-
turer can replay them to obtain the second set of valid submissions.
This is achieved by synthesizing and replaying the events with the
initEvent() and initMouseEvent() APIs. In general, the
implementations of the event recorder and player is similar to Se-
lenium, which is an open-source recording and replaying tool [30].
4.2.3 One-time Tokens Detector
This detector concerns only server-generated parameters that are
originated from hidden fields and query string of submission URLs.
Working as a browser add-on, CRS can easily sort out these param-
eters by DOM inspection. The name/value pairs in the query string
are then properly decoded using the decodeURIComponent()
API. Among these server-generated parameters, it identifies those
parameters that have the same name yet distinct values across each
corresponding pair of requests between the initial and second valid
sets of submissions.
Each of these identified candidates is confirmed of one-time use
if making an identical request will indeed lead to a server rejection.
Given a non-AJAX form, it is relatively easy to tamper the corre-
sponding hidden field or submission URL and reuse the token in
order to spoof an identical request. A server rejection, which is lit-
erally a lack of any of the key features, can then be asserted. How-
ever, for forms submitted over AJAX, more complex techniques
to be detailed in Section 4.3.2 and 4.2.5 are similarly used here to
spoof an identical request as well as to find if any key features are
missing. The names of these confirmed parameters are recorded,
and they will be preserved when fuzzing other parameters.
4.2.4 Parameter Dependency Detector
This detector is actually responsible only for identifying candi-
dates of dependent parameters, which are subject to further confir-
mation by the Fuzzer. First, CRS applies regular expressions to de-
termine the value types. For instance, /^[\d,]+(?:\.\d+)?$/
is used to test for numbers. With any commas stripped, the nu-
meric values are casted into float using the parseFloat() API,
while all other values are trimmed. When comparing the param-
eters across the requests of the initial valid set of submissions, it
neglects the names but considers only those transformed values. A
candidate parameter is finally considered dependent to another pa-
rameter of the last request only if two values are identical. The
references (i.e., id attribute or XPath location) to these candidates
are recorded.
4.2.5 Valid Features Detector
This module is to determine the key features that indicate repro-
ducible acceptances by the server. The references to the candidate
elements of key features are recorded throughout the initial valid
set of submissions. In the second valid set of submissions, the
extracted features are relocated in the rendered server responses.
Hence, the final key features to be used are all verified to be repro-
ducible in both valid set of submissions.
First of all, the buttons that are clicked and captured in the Action
Recorder automatically qualify as the key features since they are
always needed to follow the intended workflow.
Next, CRS extracts a number of other key features by locating
user-supplied parameters that are visually reflected in the rendered
responses. This is achieved by searching for the presence of a pa-
rameter value in the textContent and value attributes of ev-
ery leaf node through DOM tree traversal. This technique is com-
monly used in search engine keyword highlighting [36]. Never-
theless, CRS handles number matching differently in order to tol-
erate formatting issues that are introduced by the server. For in-
stance, 12345 is first converted to a regular expression object, i.e.,
\/1[^\d]?2[^\d]?3[^\d]?4[^\d]?5\/, and can thus find
its presence in a node content such as $12,345.00. If a value has
resulted in multiple occurrences that exceed a configurable limit1,
the candidate parameter is disqualified. Obviously, each parameter
is mutated based on its specific features.
In case no parameter reflections can be identified, CRS will heuris-
tically search for some keywords that indicate sever acceptance
with the same DOM traversal approach. The case insensitive key-
word choices include “success, done, complete(d), execute(d), ok(ay),
or update(d)” but must also exclude “not, n’t, fail(ed), err(or) or
sorry”. Since the extension to multi-lingual support is trivial, so a
string is now tested only as follows:
/\b(?:success(?:ful)?|done|completed?|executed?|
ok(?:ay)?|updated?)\b/i.test(string)
&& !/\b(?:not|sorry|fail(?:ed)?|err(?:or)?)\b
|(?:[a-z]n\'t\b)/i.test(string)
The approximate string matching algorithms [24] may better per-
form in some applications, but they are not used here for less com-
plexity. In case of no identifiable features, the analyst will be
prompted to provide a regular expression statement for asserting
the server acceptance. We so far did not encounter such a manual
need in our experiments.
The CRS approach focuses on the rendered responses to lo-
cate key features even for AJAX applications. It generally ignores
the raw response data as replied from the server, but simply allows
the testing application itself to react accordingly and make DOM
changes. In this regard, CRS is so designed to leverage the ap-
plication itself to generate the required XMLHttpRequests. So,
the relevant onstatechange handlers that respond to the AJAX
feedbacks can be triggered.
1For instance, a single-character value such as 1 or 0 will likely oc-
cur everywhere. While a maximum of 3 times is generally reason-
able for applications that reflect parameters, here we do not quest
for a magic number but leave it configurable.
1 while (action = userActionList.next()) {
2 if (action.isSubmissionClick()
3 && param = paramList.nextCandidate()
4 && !param.isOneTimeToken()
5 && !param.isDependencyDetected()) {
6 getClientRejected(param)
7 form.forceSubmission()
8 detectServerAcceptance()
9 } else {
10 action.replay()
11 paramList.addNewlyAppearedFields()
12 }
13 }
14 function getClientRejected(param) {
15 if (mutated = param.nextMutated()) {
16 form.interceptSubmission(function() {
17 form.cancelSubmission()
18 getClientRejected(param)
19 })
20 form.fillIn(mutated)
21 action.replay()
22 paramList.addNewlyAppearedFields()
23 }
24 }
Listing 1: The core algorithm of the Fuzzer
On the other hand, CRS limits the scope of feature searching
to accurately the part that changes after the AJAX form submis-
sion. To implement this, CRS registers a callback function to the
MutationObserver API [23] right before the submit button is
clicked. After the application has made some DOM changes, the
callback function will be invoked with those DOM objects that re-
ceive the changes, where the feature extraction algorithm will be
applied to those visible objects. Only if no visual changes are ever
made, CRS will use the HTTP status code and response data to de-
termine server acceptances. However, we did not encounter such a
case in the websites we tested.
4.3 The Fuzzer of CRS
The Fuzzer begins by confirming the list of dependent param-
eters. It replays the captured user actions up to the page where
a candidate dependent parameter is found. The value of which is
then mutated to ensure that it differs from that of the last request
to make a dependency breaking attempt. Finally, the dependency
is confirmed if a server rejection is encountered. To assert this, a
fuzzing technique that is also applied to other non-candidate pa-
rameters is used and described as follows.
Listing 1 outlines the core algorithm of the Fuzzer. It sequen-
tially replays the captured user actions (Line 1 & 10) and stops
before a submission click (Line 2). Parameters that are confirmed
of one-time use (Line 4) or dependent to a previous request (Line
5) are exempted from fuzzing. Other parameters are mutated one
by one with respect to its default or user-given value (Line 15). The
mutated parameter is then placed back to the form, and the corre-
sponding events (e.g., onclick, onchange) are also triggered
(Line 20). Any newly appeared fields will also be captured here
for later mutation (Line 11 & 22). Upon replaying the submis-
sion click event (Line 21), the web application itself validates the
form concerned. If a submission is attempted, that means the mu-
tated parameter is accepted by the client-side validations (Line 16).
The Fuzzer will however cancel the submission (Line 17), and re-
peatedly mutate the parameter until it is rejected by the client-side
(Line 18). With that client-side rejected parameter, the Fuzzer by-
passes the validations to force a form submission (Line 7). Finally,
it asserts a server acceptance by locating all the valid key features
(Line 8), and is able to report those parameters that are rejected by
the client-side validation but accepted by the server as vulnerable
to parameter tampering attacks.
Those smaller modules including the Parameter Mutator and
Vulnerability Detector are detailed as follows. The discussion on
Action Player is omitted as it is the same as that in the Capturer.
4.3.1 Parameter Mutator
This module is responsible for generating mutated values. The
default values, or otherwise analyst-provided ones form the bases
for mutations. First, CRS mutates the numeric portion of this exist-
ing value in order to derive some integral, decimal, negated, incre-
mented, decremented, and multiplied versions (e.g., parseInt(),
+n/1000, −n, +n, × − 1, ×n, where n comes from some hard-
coded and randomized integers).
CRS then determines the input types by inferring from the whole
value (e.g., /[\d,\.]+/ for numbers), type attributes (e.g., date
from HTML 5), class attributes (e.g., alphanumeric, datepicker; as
often employed by JavaScript validation libraries [28]), name at-
tributes, and field labels (e.g., tel, date). For boolean values that are
likely represented in 1, 0 ,Y, N, T, F, true, or false, new values
are derived by negating the boolean. For certain input types such as
date, time and percentage, CRS adds some relevant hardcoded val-
ues (e.g., 2013-9-22, 23:59, 111%). Optionally, the Mutator
is configurable to also output test cases for violating the input types
and other field restrictions such as required and maxlength
(e.g., concatenating an existing value with itself by multiple times).
Here some of the hardcoding values are borrowed from a tool
called TamperData [20]. It is certain that this heuristic input gen-
eration module is imperfect, and can be further enhanced by per-
forming extra coding analysis [3,7,8]. However, the current setting
is found sufficient in our experiments.
4.3.2 Vulnerability Detector
This subsection mainly enumerates how to intercept and cancel
submission attempts (client-side accepted parameters) as well as
force a submission (client-side rejected parameters) for each form
submission approach. Interestingly, this involves flipping the orig-
inal decision on whether to proceed a submission. With a fuzzing
attempt that is client-side rejected, CRS can then discern server ac-
ceptances by detecting those valid features found by the Capturer.
Intervening in Event-based Form Submission. To intercept
the submission, CRS interposes on the onsubmit handler of the
form to wrap the original one. Our handler disables HTML 5 au-
tomatic validations by setting form.noValidate to false. It
then discerns the parameter validity by examining the return values
of the original onsubmit handler and form.checkValidity()
method that respectively reflect the results of JavaScript and HTML
5 validations. If an accepted parameter is encountered (i.e., both re-
turned true), CRS will return false in our onsubmit handler
to cancel the submission. For rejected parameters, CRS forces the
submission by returning true in our handler.
Intervening in Programmatic Form Submission. To inter-
cept the programmatic submission, CPS overrides the submit()
method of the form. To discern parameter validity, we cannot rely
on the return value which is always void. Instead, we know that
our method will be called only with client-side accepted parame-
ters. We will then simply ignore the submissions for these param-
eters. For other (i.e., rejected) parameters, CPS deliberately calls
the original submit() method to force submissions.
Intervening in AJAX Form Submission. Intervening in AJAX
submissions is the most challenging implementation for the follow-
ing reasons. First, we do not assume web applications to use any
particular JavaScript libraries such as jQuery [28]. Second, in con-
trast to the previous approaches of which the event and method are
directly associated with a form object, XMLHttpRequest mul-
tiplexes all kinds of HTTP requests that are non-specific to form
submissions (i.e., without a function like form.ajaxSubmit()
that can be intercepted similarly). Third, owing to the asynchronous
nature, multiple AJAX requests can simultaneously exist, such as
refreshing a placeholder for advertisements and dynamic valida-
tions that involve server feedbacks (e.g. nickname uniqueness).
Hence, it is non-trivial to distinguish which request is responsible
for the form submission concerned.
We solve this problem by first intercepting the methods open()
and send() at the prototype level of XMLHttpRequest, which
are invoked before making a request. It is necessary to intercept
both open() and send() methods, through which input param-
eters are provided respectively for GET and POST requests.
To distinguish the particular request that corresponds to the
form submission, CPS appends a nonce to the value of an existing
(hidden) input control2, of which its validity is unaffected. Hence,
the AJAX request that consists of this nonce can be isolated in
our intercepted methods. Here, an invocation of our intercepted
send() method implies that the parameter is client-side accepted.
CPS discards the submission by ignoring it.
For client-side rejected parameters, the application will not even
instantiate the XMLHttpRequest. Given a simple application, it
may be feasible to reproduce the instantiation by program slicing.
But we instead develop a more succinct approach. CPS achieves a
forced submission by reusing the set of valid parameters to trigger
a submission request. But then the parameters are substituted with
the client-side rejected ones at the intercepted methods. The nonce
is also removed during so before sending the requests.
5. EVALUATIONS
This section focuses on evaluating the proposed scanning ap-
proach in terms of its practicality and effectiveness. Practicality
considers how well CRS can automate and intercept real-world ap-
plications, while effectiveness measures the vulnerability scanning
capabilities. All experiments are conducted with an entry-level
PC using Firefox. The lightweight implementation actually incurs
only negligible performance overhead, and that the scanning time
is dominated by the server responsiveness and a configurable delay
deliberately introduced to avoid “DoS-ing” the servers. We thus
omit here a benchmark on performance overhead. If needed, the
fuzzing time can be further reduced by using a headless browser [27].
This section also briefly discusses some insights behind the se-
vere vulnerabilities uncovered with the scanner, and shares how
they are responsibly reported and subsequently resolved [34].
5.1 Ethical Concerns
For the practicality evaluation which generates no tampered re-
quests, there are no ethical issues. For the effectiveness evalua-
tion, we turned tampering on in real-world web applications. In the
worst case scenarios, the tampered banking transfer requests could
possibly result in money transferred either from our account to an
unknown account or from an unknown account to ours. We thus
tested only the interbank transfer applications which all require at
least two days to take effect, and hence we have sufficient time
to manually cancel (or make instant transfer before) any unwanted
transactions. To further limit the risk, all requests are capped to use
only a small amount of money during the automated fuzzing. To
confirm a vulnerability to be a working exploit, we only manually
2Alternatively, we can inject a hidden field with a nonce value, so
that it will be submitted along with other field values.
made online transfers from and to accounts that are owned by us
at different banks. All findings were promptly disclosed to the af-
fected parties. We were grateful for being formally recognized by
the government and banks’ officials as “good citizens”.
5.2 Empirical Results
We tested a total of seven applications, including five online
banking transfer applications including HSBC, BEA, Citibank, BOC,
and Hang Seng Bank (HSB), followed by two traveling websites
including Jetstar airline and an online travel agent Webjet. These
banks are chosen since their branches are in close geographical
proximity to our institution, so that we can minimize the overhead
of visiting them for opening bank accounts. The traveling websites
are chosen because of a plan to visit Australia, where the headquar-
ters of Jetstar and Webjet are located.
Practicality Evaluation. We found that CRS can practically
drive all the testing applications to run successfully. In this regard,
CRS outperforms the existing scanners, which fail to support many
critical features that are required for effective scanning, as tabulated
in Table 1. Some scanners cannot even run the applications due to
their lack of JavaScript and AJAX support.
We are unaware of any unsupported form designs except those
with non-standard input controls and those built with plug-ins such
as Adobe Flash. This limitation is however non-specific to CRS but
also other parameter tampering scanners [1, 7, 8, 20].
Effectiveness Evaluation. We evaluated that CRS is effec-
tive in uncovering some previously unknown vulnerabilities even
in banking websites. Table 2 summarizes the confusion matrix of
the vulnerability scanning results, which is further discussed below.
• True Positives. The vulnerabilities uncovered in two bank-
ing websites are separately detailed in Section 5.3. CRS dis-
covered another vulnerability in an AJAX page of the official
Jetstar website. There is a restriction on tracking on-time per-
formance only from the last 10 days, but it is found bypass-
able. We confirmed manually that it allowed us to check the
performance of a randomly selected flight, which departed
even three years ago. Given that the information was once
(when within last 10 days) publicly accessible, we did not
approach the organization for a patch. This finding serves to
demonstrate the support of AJAX applications by CRS.
• True Negatives. In our experiments, CRS found no vulner-
abilities in BOC, Citibank and HSB. We manually analyzed
their client-side source code and classified them as true neg-
atives largely because the servers have mapped each account
number to a unique index (rather than using the actual ac-
count number). Thus, a tampered index could not go beyond
a pre-defined mapping of authorized accounts that is main-
tained at the server. It is indeed a proper parameter tampering
defense, as recommended by OWASP [26].
• False Positives. We are unaware of any false positives so far.
• False Negatives. Finding false negatives requires a set of
known and unpatched vulnerabilities, which is intrinsically
difficult in our blackbox evaluation. We managed to manu-
ally discover only one vulnerability in a travel booking web-
site Webjet. It was missed because the lack of domain knowl-
edge on airport code. More specifically, only some Australia
airports such as HBA would cause the vulnerability. This
limitation is non-specific to CRS but also any other scan-
ners. We believe that this vulnerability is discoverable only
by chance even with a human (when planned to visit Aus-
tralia). We contacted Webjet, which appreciated our finding
and fixed the vulnerability.
Table 2: The confusion matrix of the CRS scanning results
Positives Negatives
True HSBC, BEA, Jetstar Citibank, BOC, HSB
False / Webjet
5.3 Case Studies and Vulnerability Disclosure
Here we discuss the parameter tampering vulnerabilities un-
covered in HSBC and BEA by CRS, as well as our encounters of
responsible vulnerability disclosures. We once expected banks to
be well scrutinized by existing scanners and security audit. For
instance, the Acunetix web vulnerability scanner being used by
HSBC is also adopted by NASA and even the Pentagon [2]. Be-
ing one of the largest multinational banks, HSBC also won the
“Best Information Security Initiatives” award in the world’s best
consumer and corporate Internet banks [15]. However, their exist-
ing mitigation approaches have apparently failed. Their applica-
tion designs may provide some insights on why the vulnerabilities
would evade the detection of their existing approaches.
5.3.1 Bypassed OTP Requirement in HSBC
Figure 3 shows two screenshots of the interbank transfer appli-
cation of HSBC, which correspond to StepA and StepB in Figure 1.
Legitimate Use Cases. When transitioning from StepA to StepB ,
the server first verifies the one-time token and cross-request param-
eter dependency. The logic flow then depends on a radio button that
indicates whether the account TO is authorized (registered).
If the upper radio button is chosen, the server will make use
of the corresponding “Account Holder’s Name and Account Num-
ber” and “Bank Code and Name” fields for further format verifica-
tion. Therefore, the account number format should match with a
regular expression /^[a-zA-Z]{1,20}~~\d{1,12}$/. It is
however unlikely that checksum verification can be applied to the
TO account number since its definition is totally up to another bank.
Given an authorized account, the user still has to click “confirm” in
the review page.
If the lower radio button is chosen, the server will take an au-
thorized account from the corresponding “Bank Code and Name”,
“Account No.”, and “Account Holder’s Name” fields. The review
page will then ask the user for an OTP generated from a dedicated
hardware device. This second factor authentication is to assure that
the transfer is authorized by the legitimate user. In either case,
the bank sends out an SMS to the user. The TO account number
is however partially masked, and that neither the holder name nor
registered status are provided.
Vulnerability Details. CRS is first provided with an initial
valid set of user actions that go through the complete workflow to
transfer $1 from our account to an authorized account. CRS then
automates the rest of the discovery, and reported several parameter
tampering possibilities for the TO parameter. Among the scanning
results, the simplest possibility was to increment the numeric por-
tion of the original value by one (i.e., FUND RECEIPIENT~~290
123456883).
We manually confirmed this vulnerability by transferring money
out from our HSBC account, and were able to receive it in an unau-
thorized account of our own in another bank. It is likely that the
mutated (i.e., unauthorized) account number was handled by the
logic branch responsible for authorized accounts. Hence, the most-
trusted OTP was completely bypassed! It is reasonable that even a
transaction-signing device [17] could not help in this regard.
As a consequence, an attacker transferring his money to an
“unauthorized” account can dispute the transaction on the basis that
it does not correspond to a use of OTP. Alternatively, he can steal
	  Figure 3: The online banking transfer application of HSBC responds with a different review page based on the choice of radio buttons
money from those victims whose sessions can be hijacked or whose
credentials can be purchased from underground communities.
Existing scanners miss this vulnerability due to the enforce-
ments of one-time use tokens, cross-request parameter dependency,
and client-side pre-processing.
Disclosure. It was threatening that two out of four banks (by
the time we ran the first set of experiments) were confirmed as be-
ing vulnerable, in spite of the limited applications we scanned. This
made us believe that the prevalence of parameter tampering vul-
nerabilities were heavily under-estimated in online banks. Having
failed to contact the right representative of HSBC, we anonymized
its name and reported our findings to the government authority re-
sponsible for maintaining monetary and banking stability. The au-
thority took our findings seriously and met with us in person to
avoid any discloses through a wire. Promptly after the meeting, the
authority alerted all licensed banks to request them for a check and
possible fix, which may explain that no further vulnerabilities were
later found in other banks. It later forwarded to us a technical clar-
ification request from HSBC, which rolled out a patch in two days.
The authority and HSBC expressed their gratitude in writing.
5.3.2 Unauthorized Transfer in Bank of East Asia
Here we outline only the findings that are specific to BEA.
Legitimate Use Case. The interbank transfer application of
BEA allows transfers only to registered accounts, which can be
authorized only by visiting a physical branch. In other words, one
can never make an online transfer to any unregistered accounts as a
protection. No SMS and email notifications were implemented.
Vulnerability Details. Similar to HSBC, CRS was able to re-
port a vulnerability that result in unauthorized transfers owing to
the lack of proper server-side validations. We manually confirmed
the vulnerability by transferring $10,000 from our account to an
unregistered account of our own.
We noticed an interesting implementation that a hidden field
called MACcode is set at the client-side before any form valida-
tions and submission. Its value is prepared by concatenating the
transaction parameters (i.e., FROM, TO, AMT) and encoding the re-
sult by the Base64 scheme. The server was found rejecting those
requests if the MACcode received does not align with the transac-
tion parameters. Since CRS places a mutated parameter back to the
application, the parameter can undergo the same MACcode algo-
rithm at the client-side. So, it is clear that such an algorithm cannot
protect message authenticity, as opposed to its confusing name.
Existing scanners miss this vulnerability owing to the enforce-
ments of client-side pre-processing and intended workflow.
Disclosure. More than a week after our experiments, we dis-
closed the vulnerability directly to BEA. Apparently, no monitoring
alarms were triggered regardless of the large transaction amount.
They acknowledged our finding, and promptly fixed it within a day.
Their system was later enhanced by dispatching email notifications.
6. RELATED WORK
6.1 Parameter Tampering Scanners
Blackbox. Blackbox scanners are not tied to any specific frame-
works and languages used on the server-side. This makes them of-
ten more generic than whitebox approaches. In general, they all
work by first crawling an application to capture any requests en-
countered, then fuzzing it by replaying the requests with some mu-
tated parameters. Proxy-based parameter tampering scanners in-
clude the HTTP fuzzer in Acunetix [1], WebScarab [25], and Tam-
perData [20]. They accept per-request fuzzing, and thus cannot
automatically observe the intended workflow. They also require
considerable amount of manual configurations such as specifying
(a) a self-signed SSL certificate for interceptions of encrypted traf-
fic [14], and; (b) even explicit value range of each parameter.
NoTamper [7] outperforms proxy-based parameter tampering
by reducing the manual efforts needed. Similar to CRS, it auto-
mates parameter generation based on the client-side validations.
With static symbolic execution and constraint solving (that cur-
rently support the event-based form submissions only), it is able
to generate an exhaustive set of parameters that are rejected by the
client-side. This approach can complement the Parameter Mutator
of CRS. It however requires an analyst to provide two (i.e., valid
and invalid) initial sets of requests though, so as to discern whether
the server accepts the mutated requests.
To preserve the intended workflow during fuzzing, research
work is found only for scanning other web vulnerabilities such as
XSS. A state-aware fuzzer [11] is able to detect whether a fuzzing
attempt has triggered a state change. If changed, it backtracks to
the previous state by page traversal. It thus allows every state to be
completely fuzzed by all candidate parameters before moving on to
the next state. However, this stateful scanner can handle static web
pages only, i.e., AJAX applications are not supported.
Nonetheless, all these scanners are limited owing to their fun-
damental scanner design. It is very hard to enhance them in han-
dling the one-time use tokens, cross-request parameter dependen-
cies, and client-side pre-processing. Their fuzzing requests are thus
likely barred from reaching vulnerable code.
On the other hand, there are studies that evaluate the effective-
ness of existing web vulnerability scanners. According to [6], the
commercial scanners being evaluated are found not to be as com-
prehensive as they are claimed to be. This evaluation however cov-
ers only vulnerabilities like XSS, and it does not cover parameter
tampering. According to [12], the study found that none of its eval-
uated scanners could find a parameter tampering vulnerability. It
also suggests that high-level domain knowledge on the application
is needed, but can hardly be known without a human.
PAPAS [5] focuses only on a specific variant of parameter tam-
pering, namely the parameter pollution vulnerabilities. Its success
relies on the use of a server-side parameter precedence algorithm
that allows malicious parameter to take over the precedence of an
existing parameter. Its scanning approach is thus very similar to
finding reflected vectors such as XSS, and that is different from
finding more general parameter tampering vulnerabilities.
Whitebox. When server-side source code is available, white-
box scanners can be used to compare the inconsistencies between
client-side and server-side validations.
WAPTEC [8] extends the NoTamper [7] approach by apply-
ing similar coding analysis to the server-side validations. The ad-
ditional knowledge eliminates the manual effort required, and im-
proves the selection of candidate parameter. But it still suffers from
the limitations of NoTamper such as the negligence of the cross-
request parameter dependency.
ViewPoints [3] discovers validation inconsistencies between the
client-side and server-side by differential string analysis. It sup-
ports only a specific framework of the Java web applications. Be-
sides reporting those parameters that are client-rejected yet server-
accepted, its goal is to also report parameters that are client-accepted
yet server-rejected. Eliminating this latter class of inconsistencies
from the application can improve in usability but not its security.
In general, what can be validated from the server and client
sides is intrinsically inconsistent since the server is always more
knowledgeable (e.g., access to DB) than the client, and thus these
approaches must report many false positives. It is also difficult to
first annotate all the expected inconsistencies particularly in real-
world complex applications before running these tools.
6.2 Parameter Tampering Mitigations
InteGuard [35] is a whitebox protection approach that operates
a server-side proxy to verify the parameters exchanged between
the server and a client as well as those further exchanged with a
third-party server. It relies on a human to provide some valid trans-
actions for analyzing the parameter dependencies in its learning
phase. Then its online defense is to drop subsequent requests that
violate the expected dependencies. Its mitigation is limited only to
those parameters triggered by human. CRS can automatically ex-
plore the client-side events to uncover new parameters, which can
be hardly exhausted by a human in the training phase.
Some development frameworks such as .NET [4] and Java [16]
can replicate the server-side validations to become client-side code.
However, they are often limited to simple validations that are pur-
posely programmed for replications. Swift [9] proposes that devel-
opers should annotate those parameters and codes that are sensitive
to run only on server-side or safe for both sides to facilitate replica-
tion. But again, it is demanding to annotate even a simple program.
Server-side validations and sanitizations are still fundamental
defenses against parameter tampering. For client-side validations
aiming at delivering better user experience, HTML 5 Validations [18]
and JavaScript libraries such as jQuery [28] can be deployed.
6.3 Others
Compared to [33, 34] which also explored parameter relation-
ships, CRS systematically analyzes all the parameter dependencies
between different tuples of requests and responses, as shown in
Figure 2. As a result, CRS can automatically detect server ac-
ceptances by analyzing Req vs Resp and Resp vs Resp’,
which makes a significant improvement over the manual and protocol-
specific approaches as with [33,34]. The proposed model checking
also requires human effort in accurately transforming a subset of
logic replica from the original application [34].
Some existing work also involve in replaying user actions, but
none of which have identified the advantage of fuzzing inside the
application context, that is, by intercepting the submission requests
for fuzzing. Mugshot [21] deterministically captures and replays
user actions and other JavaScript functions for failure and usabil-
ity analysis. Kudzu [29] enhances its code coverage by exploring
client-side events for the discovery of more client-side injection
vulnerabilities. Ripley [32] maintains a server-side replica of the
client-side logic in a shadow browser hosted in a trusted proxy, and
attempts to automatically replicate and replay the client-side events
in the replica for integrity check. Although it ensures the com-
putation integrity of the client-side code, it does not eliminate the
need for server-side validations. Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scan-
ner [2] is able to generate some user action events while scanning
for XSS vulnerabilities.
7. CONCLUSION
We studied a number of real-world web applications to under-
stand their implementations, and how they can be intercepted for
vulnerability scanning. Existing parameter tampering scanners do
not consider the enforcements of, among others, the intended work-
flow, one-time use tokens, and parameter dependency across re-
quests, which are all common in multi-request applications. Their
effectiveness of vulnerability scanning is thus severely limited. We
proposed the novel CRS approach to respect all these enforcements.
We realized the approach by building a generic blackbox parame-
ter tampering scanner. In our evaluation, it is practical to drive real
applications to run for fuzzing. The importance of this work is
demonstrated by the vulnerabilities uncovered in real-world appli-
cations including banks, which existing scanners miss. The scan-
ning approach can also be extended to the discovery of other web
application vulnerabilities including XSS and CSRF.
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